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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we introduce novel techniques that enhance
the training phase of Anomaly Detection (AD) sensors. Our
aim is to both improve the detection performance and pro-
tect against attacks that target the training dataset. Our
approach is two pronged: we employ a novel sanitization
method for large training datasets that removes attacks and
traffic artifacts by measuring their frequency and position
inside the dataset. Furthermore, we extend the training
phase in the spatial dimension to include model information
from other collaborative systems. We demonstrate that by
doing so we can protect all the participating systems against
targeted training attacks.
Another aspect of our system is its ability to adapt and
update the normality model when there is a shift in the
nature of inspected traffic that reflects actual changes in
the back-end servers. Such “on-line” training appears to
be the “Achilles’ heel” of AD sensors because they fail to
adapt when there is a legitimate deviation in the traffic be-
havior, thereby flooding the operator with false positives.
To counter that, we discuss the integration of what we call
a shadow sensor with the AD system. This sensor com-
plements our techniques by acting as an oracle to analyze
and classify the resulting “suspect data” identified by the
AD sensor. We show that our techniques can be applied to
a wide range of unmodified AD sensors without incurring
significant additional computational cost beyond the initial
training phase.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent research indicates that signature-based network in-
trusion detection systems (NIDS) are quickly becoming in-
effective in identifying malicious traffic [4, 1, 5], especially
that generated by polymorphic attack engines [5]. Relying
on anomaly detection (AD) sensors to detect 0-day attacks
has become a necessity rather than an option. Effective
anomaly detection, however, requires highly accurate mod-
eling of normal traffic — a process that remains an open
problem [7] and the subject of this paper. Traditional ap-
proaches to modeling network traffic in this context typically
measure only a few features based on a limited training data
set and ignore the hard problem of vetting updates to the
environment to distinguish between valid, sanctioned diver-
gence from this initial measurement and invalid or attacker-
driven changes. Ideally, an AD should achieve 100% detec-
tion accuracy, i.e., true attacks are all identified, with 0%
false positives. Reaching this ideal is very hard due to the
following problems:
• The generated model can under-fit the actual normal
traffic. Under-fitting for an AD system means that
the AD system will erroneously flag traffic as “normal”
leading to an overly generalized model. Attackers who
have sufficient room to disguise their exploit as normal
can bypass a poorly defined normality model, thus in-
creasing the “false negatives” of the AD sensor.
• The model of normal traffic can over-fit the training
data: non-attack traffic that is not observed during
training can be regarded as anomalous. Over-fitting
may generate an excessive amount of false alerts or
“false positives.”
• Unsupervised anomaly sensors often lack a measure of
ground truth to compare to and verify against. The
presence of an attack in the training data “poisons”
the normal model, thus rendering the AD system in-
capable of detecting future or closely related instances
of this attack. In short, the AD system may produce
false negatives. This risk becomes a limiting factor of
the size of the training set [6].
• Even in the presence of ground truth, creating a single
model of normal traffic which includes all non-attack
traffic can result in under-fitting and over generaliza-
tion.
These problems appear to stem from a common source:
the quality of the normality model that an AD system em-
ploys to detect abnormal traffic. This single and monolithic
normality model is the product of a training phase that tra-
ditionally uses all traffic from a non-sanitized training data
set. The problem that we address in this paper is
the difficulty of creating and maintaining robust nor-
mality models that can be used for efficient anomaly
detection. Applications range from single detectors oper-
ating on a local dataset to large systems distributed over
space and/or time.
2. APPROACH
The first component that we have developed extends the
AD training phase to successfully sanitize training data
[2], while achieving both a high rate of detection and a low
rate of false positives. Instead of using a normal model gen-
erated by a single AD sensor trained on a single large set of
data, we use multiple AD instances trained on small data
slices. Therefore, we produce multiple normal models, which
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we call micro-models, by training AD instances on small,
disjoint subsets of the original dataset. Each of these micro-
models represents a very localized view of the training data.
Armed with the micro-models, we are now in a position to
assess the quality of our training data and automatically
detect and remove any attacks or abnormalities that should
not be considered part of the normal model. Our approach
shares elements with the ensemble method [3] because we
also construct a set of classifiers and then classify the new
data points using a (weighted) vote to decide. However,
we modify the training phase by generating models from
slices of the training data and also we lack the existence of a
ground truth. The threat model for this approach consists of
persistent and/or targeted attacks, or other anomalies that
persist throughout the majority of the training set.
The next logical step is to develop methods for sanitiza-
tion of AD models. Undertaking this type of sanitization
becomes useful when additional information becomes avail-
able after the training phase has concluded. We apply model
sanitization methods in a novel distributed strategy which
leverages the location diversity of collaborating sites to ex-
change information that can be used to improve each site’s
model. Even if the identities of the collaborating sites be-
come known, attacking all the sites with targeted or blend-
ing attacks is a challenging task: the attacker would have
to generate mimicry attacks against all collaborators and
blend the attack traffic using the individual sites’ normal
data models. Model sanitization techniques can also be ap-
plied in MANET environments: in such situations, trusted
devices usually lack the resources necessary to build models
from scratch (i.e., from the training data). Sharing already-
built models reduces the burden.
Another important aspect of anomaly detection models
is that they have to reflect the dynamic changes that are
exhibited in the system’s behavior. We apply what we call
a progressive model update; we employ this procedure when
changes are caused by observable external factors that can-
not otherwise be controlled (for example, a previously ob-
scure Web page becomes popular). We propose to “fre-
quently” update the sanitized model to reflect the dynamic
changes in the network or users (including attackers) be-
havior. Updating the sanitized model implies updating the
micro-models and applying the voting mechanism on the
same training dataset as the one used for building the micro-
models. We define this type of sanitization as introspective.
We propose to age the older micro-models when new ones
are built, but even so the use of micro-models might intro-
duce a delay in the updating process. This delay occurs
when there is a strong relationship between the mutation
speed and the time granularity of the micro-models.
Finally, an important aspect of our work regards the effi-
ciency of the resulting AD systems. Many papers comment
on anomaly detectors having too high a false positive rate,
thus making them less than ideal sensors. We see such com-
ments as the “false false positive problem.”. In this
paper, we describe the use of a heavily instrumented host-
based “shadow sensor”: a system that behaves as an oracle
for the AD sensor to accurately distinguish between alerts
that represent false positive and those that represent real at-
tacks. Such systems perform substantially slower than the
uninstrumented application. As a result, we only wish to
infrequently employ the services of the oracle so that most
traffic enjoys a fast path of service; only traffic that is alerted
on is sent to the oracle for confirmation of an attack. We fo-
cus on producing a sensor that identifies few “suspect data”
items that are subjected to further but time-expensive tests.
In this way, real attacks do not cause damage to the system
under protection, and false positives do not flood an oper-
ational center with too many alarms. Instead, the shadow
sensor processes both true attacks and incorrectly classified
packets to validate whether a packet signifies a true attack.
These packets are still processed by the intended shadowed
application and only cause an increased delay for network
traffic incorrectly deemed an attack.
Our experiments employ two content-based anomaly de-
tectors Anagram [9] and Payl [8]. These AD sensors have
very different learning algorithms. The experimental results
indicate that the alerts generated when using the “sanitized”
AD model represent a small fraction of the total traffic. The
model detects approximately 5 times more attack packets
than the original unsanitized AD model. In addition, the
AD system can detect more threats both online and after
an actual attack, since the AD training data are attack-
free. In case the local sanitization is evaded, we extend our
methodology to support sharing models of abnormal traffic
among collaborating sites. A site can cross-sanitize its lo-
cal training data based on the remote models. Our results
show that, if the collaborating sites were targeted by the
same attack and they were able to capture it in their ab-
normal models, the detection rate can be improved up to
100%.
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